Interregional JRE is distinct from international JRE, because for the former the participating regions are under a constitutional or quasi-constitutional regime, such as the US Constitution for American states or the European Union Treaty for EU Members. For the case of international JRE, no mutually accepted constitutional or quasi-constitutional system exists between signatories. For example, China and France concluded the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs, 12 but they have never shared any constitutional or quasi-constitutional regime. Thus, the JRE between China and France is international JRE.
As between Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, the policy of "one country, two systems" provides a similar quasi-constitutional regime. After the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) gained sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 and over Macao on 20 December 1999, 13 it designated Hong Kong and Macao as Special Administrative Regions (SARs) under this policy.
14 The Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, had originally formulated this 10 "Region" and "country" are not used interchangeably in this paper. "Country" is a territorial unit with sovereignty. But "region" may be a country, or a territorial subdivision of a country and this subdivision has no sovereignty. Therefore, a "country" is a "region" but a "region" is not necessarily a "country".
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This paper focuses on what lessons US and EU law may provide to develop the interregional JRE system in China. In this context, "state" is less appropriate than "region" for two reasons. (indicating that "hereafter the word 'state' is used to denote any country or a territorial subdivision of a country, such as a state or province, that has its own system of private law"). This defi nition is actually borrowed from Art 2 of the US 1st Restatement of Confl icts, which provides "the word state denotes a territorial unit in which the general body of law is separate and distinct from the law of any other territorial unit". However, the latter defi nition of "state" is for the purpose of the Restatement rather than in a general sense.
Ibid, Art 2 provides that "the National People's Congress authorizes Hong Kong to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of fi nal adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law". In addition, Arts 12-23 provide that Hong Kong shall be vested with autonomous rights in dealing with its own affairs except foreign affairs and defence. Therefore, as SARs, Hong Kong and Macao enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than autonomous regions in China, such as the Tibet Autonomous Region. For comments regarding the policy of "one country, two systems", see P Raghubir and GV Johar, "Hong Kong 1997 in Context" (1999) 63 Public Opinion Quarterly 543.
a very high degree of autonomy, they should have equal status to Mainland China in terms of JRE. This paper is divided into three sections. The fi rst one analyses the status quo of the interregional JRE in China, the second discusses the relationship between interregional economic integration and JRE, and the last section explores the lessons that the US and EU interregional JRE laws can offer China for solving the four most crucial challenges in developing its interregional JRE system. In this paper, a judgment-rendering court or forum (F1) refers to the court that rendered a judgment; a requested court or forum (F2) means the court that is requested to recognise or enforce a judgment.
B. INTERREGIONAL JRE IN CHINA: THE STATUS QUO
The current interregional JRE system between Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao is constituted both by bilateral regimes in the form of interregional arrangements and unilateral regimes in the form of regional laws. Two such arrangements exist: the Arrangement between the Mainland and Macao on the Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments (the "Mainland-Macao Arrangement"), 21 and the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of Hong Kong Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements between the Parties Concerned (the "Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement"). 22 These arrangements established the basic framework of interregional JRE laws in China. Judgments excluded by the two arrangements Such as non-monetary judgments or judgments for disputes in which parties failed to make a choice-of-court agreement.
Civil Procedure Law (CPL) 24 and its judicial interpretations, 25 the Macao Civil Procedure Code 26 and Hong Kong common law 27 . Figure 1 demonstrates the current JRE system among Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao. Both statute and common law govern recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Hong Kong. The statute mainly refers to Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 319) (the "FJREO"). But the FJREO was essentially an intra-Commonwealth scheme for reciprocal enforcement of judgments between Australia, Bermuda, Brunei, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Sri Lanka. The non-Commonwealth countries that the FJREO also applied to are those that the UK had JRE treaties with, ie Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Israel. So judgments rendered by courts in Mainland China and Macao are recognised and enforced in Hong Kong under the common law. Under the common law, a judgment creditor can either sue on the foreign judgment as a debt or relitigate the merits of the case. Except that recognition and enforcement under the common law does not have a reciprocity requirement and some differences of detail, the underlying substantive rules and principles in the FJREO and common law are largely similar. Before a Hong Kong court decides whether to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment, it will consider if the judgment-rendering court has competent jurisdiction. It will also decide if the original judgment is obtained through fair procedures and absence of fraud. A Hong Kong court will recognise and enforce a judgment if it is fi nal, on the merits and about private rights. It will refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment in order to protect Hong Kong public policy. In addition, it will not recognise or enforce a foreign judgment, which has been wholly satisfi ed, or which cannot be enforced in the country where it is rendered. Comparatively, the registration process makes the JRE under the FJREO simpler than under common law. Moreover the two JRE schemes are mutually exclusive, which means that if a judgment is enforceable under "Anpai" or "arrangement" is not a formal legal term, 28 but it is used in the title of the three legal documents concerning service, JRE, and recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards between Mainland China and Hong Kong, and those between Mainland China and Macao. 29 This term is also found in legal documents concerning interregional economic issues. Examples include the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and the Mainland and Macao CEPA. 30 Future legal documents concerning interregional issues in China will probably continue to use this term. The selection of this term is deliberate. Compared with other more widely used legal terms, such as "agreement", "treaty" and "convention", "arrangement" in Chinese has a stronger connotation of family and of reaching a consensus harmoniously, peacefully, jointly and amicably. This is consistent with Confucianism, which emphasises solving disputes by a peaceful way in a family or a society. Put in legal terms, "arrangement" suggests that the three Chinese regions are equal and voluntarily agree to make joint efforts to solve legal confl icts among them for mutual benefi ts. The coexistence of Chinese regions results from a history of foreign invasions. 31 In response, the PRC has repeated that solving interregional confl icts is its internal affair and resists any foreign the FJREO, it should not be enforced under common law, and vice versa. In the enforcement proceedings under the two schemes, Hong Kong courts will not examine the merits of foreign judgments.
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The typical meaning of "arrangement" is "putting in order, plan, or preparation". It does have a meaning of "agreement or settlement", but which is seldom ranked as its top interpretations. See intervention. In a political sense, "arrangement" symbolises that it is made between local authorities to address their common affairs. Thus, it perfectly suits the legal, social, historical and political context of interregional confl icts in China.
This section analyses the two judgment arrangements. In order to achieve a better comparison, it starts from the more restrictive arrangement between Mainland China and Hong Kong and then proceeds to the more JRE-friendly arrangement between Mainland China and Macao.
The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement (a) Requirements for JRE
The scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is limited. It applies only to "an enforceable fi nal judgment requiring payment of money in a civil or commercial case pursuant to a choice of court agreement in writing, made by a People's Court of the Mainland or a court of Hong Kong". 32 First, the Arrangement is limited to judgments requiring payment of money. This means that orders of injunction or specifi c performance are excluded. Second, only fi nal judgments can be recognised and enforced under the Arrangement. Third, a severe limitation exists insofar as the Arrangement is confi ned to judgments rendered on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement. This does not mean that the parties to the judgment must be identical to those of the choice-of-court agreement: the laws of subrogation, alter ego and so forth in the region where the judgment is rendered apply. This choice-of-court agreement must be in a written form, expressly designating a Mainland court or a Hong Kong court as the one having exclusive jurisdiction. 33 The written form includes not only written contracts and letters but also electronic data messages, such as e-mails, telegrams, telexes and facsimiles. 34 commercial contracts between the parties concerned, excluding any employment contracts and contracts to which a natural person acting for personal consumption, family or other non-commercial purposes is a party (Article 3).
The limitation on judgments based on choice-of-court agreements is inspired by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the "Hague Convention"). 36 The negotiation of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement started in 2002. Since then, Mainland China has repeatedly expressed its hope that this Arrangement will cover judgments on labour contracts, marriage and family matters, but Hong Kong has been reluctant, which was one of several reasons why the negotiation took four years to reach a consensus. Many Hong Kong residents work in the Mainland, and a lot of people from the Mainland are employed in Hong Kong. Cross-region marriages are very common, and marriage and family traditions in the two regions are similar. Recognition and enforcement of non-commercial judgments can facilitate people's lives in these two regions by avoiding limping relationships. Therefore, the narrow scope and strict requirements of the Hague Convention are good for the international scenario but are restrictive for the interregional context. 37 Moreover, the Mainland-Macao Arrangement has a much broader scope and less restrictive requirements. 38 Extending the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement will promote the growth of economic and familial bonds between the two regions.
(b) Grounds for Refusing JRE
The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement provides seven mandatory circumstances in which JRE will be denied. This paper refers to these as the "seven grounds for refusal". Although the Arrangement does not indicate whether the list of seven grounds is exhaustive, 39 they should be read as an exhaustive list for the purpose of legal certainty and predictability. The following comments serve to clarify the implications of the seven grounds.
The fi rst ground is that "the choice of court agreement is invalid under the law of the place of the court chosen by agreement of the parties where the original trial was conducted, unless the chosen court has determined that the choice of court agreement is valid." 40 The same problem exists in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.
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Art 9 Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.
be applied to determine the validity of the agreement. 41 One possibility is the law of the place of the chosen court. 42 If a chosen court has decided that a choice of court agreement is valid under its law, its decision should have preclusive effect and bind any requested court. The reason is that the chosen court has the greatest expertise in its own law and its decision of the validity of the agreement under this law should be respected. However, a chosen court may issue a judgment without determining the validity of the choice of court agreement. For example, it may exert jurisdiction over the case on other jurisdictional grounds. In this scenario, the requested court can consider whether the agreement is valid under the law of the region where the chosen court is located.
The second possibility is that although the choice-of-court agreement is invalid under the law of the region where the chosen court is situated, the chosen court applies another law to decide the validity of the agreement. Under this law, the choice-of-court agreement is valid. This law can be the law of the region where the agreement is made or any other law. 43 For example, two parties concluded a choice-of-court agreement in Hong Kong but they choose a court in Mainland China to resolve their disputes. A choice-of-court agreement may be valid under Hong Kong law but invalid under Mainland law. 44 So a choice-of-court agreement may be valid under Hong Kong law but invalid under Mainland law. Suppose that the Mainland court determines the agreement is valid by invoking Hong Kong law: will this judgment be subject to the fi rst ground for refusing JRE? The answer should be negative. Favor validitatis should be applied here: the chosen court can uphold the validity of the choice-of-court agreement under any law as long as this law was enacted by a region having a connection to the dispute. This suggestion is based on the purpose of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, which is to enhance JRE between the two regions. Given this purpose, F1's decision regarding the validity of a choice-of-court agreement should have preclusive effect in F2.
The second ground for refusal is that JRE will be denied if a judgment has been wholly satisfi ed. 45 This is based on a common-sense view that a creditor should not be doubly compensated. Art 9 Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 43 See Yackee, supra n 41, 63 (providing a list of laws that may apply to determine the validity of a choice-of-court clause). The third ground for refusal is the requested court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case according to its law. 46 If a case involves real estate located in Hong Kong or an intellectual property right granted by Hong Kong, Hong Kong courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 47 Mainland law grants its courts a comparatively much broader scope of exclusive jurisdiction. For example, a People's Court should have exclusive jurisdiction over cases where a lawsuit brought on a dispute over real estate, harbour operations, succession provided that a decedent's domicile or major estate is located in the Mainland, or co-operative exploration and development of natural resources in the Mainland. 48 These grounds for exclusive jurisdiction are reasonable. However, Mainland law also requires that lawsuits brought on disputes arising from the performance of contracts for Chinese-foreign (including Mainland-Hong Kong or Mainland-Macao) equity or contractual joint ventures in Mainland China shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of People's Courts. 49 This provision was made to protect Chinese parties who establish joint ventures with foreigners. It should not be applicable to parties from Hong Kong or Macao after these two regions have become part of China. Excessive use of exclusive jurisdiction will severely undermine choice-of-court agreements and thus interregional transactions.
The fourth ground for refusal concerns due-process violation. 50 It includes cases where the party, who receives an unfavourable default judgment, had not been summoned according to the law of the judgment-rendering region, or the party had been summoned according to the law but had not been given the time to defend the proceedings as specifi ed by the law.
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Fraud is the fi fth ground for refusal. 52 If a judgment was obtained by fraud, JRE will be denied under the Arrangement. The adoption of this ground shows Mainland deference to Hong Kong law, because fraud is a common-law concept that has never existed in Mainland JRE law.
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The sixth defence is res judicata. JRE will be refused if a judgment on the same cause of action has been made by a court of the region where JRE is Art 9 Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 51 Ibid.
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Ibid.
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It should be noted that there is no fraud exception in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.
sought, or a court of this region has already recognised or enforced a judgment or an arbitral award on the same cause of action made by a court of a foreign country or an arbitration tribunal. 54 This provision does not specify whether the two judgments shall be between the same parties. The Hong Kong implementing legislation suggests that the two judgments shall be between the same parties, 55 but Mainland legislation remains silent. 56 It remains to be seen whether Mainland courts will restrict the res judicata rule to the same parties in interregional JRE.
The last ground for refusal is the public policy exception. 57 JRE will be refused if it would violate public policy of the region where the requested court is located. The law of that region determines whether a judgment is repugnant to its public policy. Maintaining the public policy exception in interregional JRE in China is consistent with the policy of "one country, two systems" because it helps to prevent "the clash between fundamentally antagonistic socialist law and capitalist law" 58 and preserve the crucial interests and autonomy of each region. 59 However, the use of public policy exception should be strictly restrained, because manipulation will create uncertainties and instabilities, 60 and, in the long run, will jeopardise the mutual trust between the regions and consequently harm the policy of "one country, two systems". Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, Ord No 9 of 2008, para 18 (1)(h) and (i) provide that "a judgment on the same cause of action between the parties to the judgment has been given by a court in Hong Kong" (emphasis added) 56 The Mainland implementation legislation of the Arrangement does not specify whether or not "the same cause of action" should be "between the parties". Art 9(6) Judicial Interpretation of 
The Mainland-Macao Arrangement
The Mainland-Macao Arrangement regulates JRE in civil and commercial cases between the Mainland and Macao. If a judgment is covered by this Arrangement, JRE will be guaranteed unless any of the fi ve grounds for refusal in the Arrangement exists. This Arrangement embarks on the full-faith-andcredit JRE between the two regions.
This Arrangement has a very broad scope. It includes not only the types of judgments covered by the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement but also judgments rendered in civil labour disputes and civil compensation in criminal proceedings. 62 Unlike the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, it provides that non-monetary judgments of one region may be petitioned for recognition through a separate proceeding or directly used in legal proceedings of the other region as effective evidence. 63 Moreover, this Arrangement requires that offi cial documents issued by a competent public institution (including notaries public) of one region should be recognised by the other region without any authentication formalities. 64 In other words, full faith and credit also extends to various offi cial documents.
Under the Arrangement, a judgment debtor may raise any of the fi ve grounds for refusing JRE: ineffective judgments, exclusive jurisdiction of the requested court, res judicata, due-process violation and public policy exception.
The Arrangement requires that a judgment qualifi ed for JRE should have legal effects, but whether a judgment is effective should be decided according to the law of the region where the judgment-rendering court is located.
65 JRE should be refused if the judgment has not become effective or is ruled not to come into force due to a retrial according to the laws of the region where the judgment is rendered.
66 Finality is not a ground for denying JRE under the Arrangement.
The only jurisdictional review explicitly allowed in the Arrangement is whether the case is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the requested court according to its law. Thus, this Arrangement is distinct from the MainlandHong Kong Arrangement, which requires a choice-of-court agreement. A requested court should be allowed to raise the defence of exclusive jurisdiction of its own motion.
The second ground is res judicata. The Mainland-Macao Arrangement provides two res judicata rules. First, JRE should be refused if, before the case was brought in the judgment-rendering court, the same case had been brought 62 Art 1 Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 63 Ibid, Art 3. 64 Ibid, Art 18. This provision applies to the original, duplicate and translation of offi cial documents. 65 Ibid, Art 11.5. 66 Ibid.
in the requested court that had proper jurisdiction. 67 This rule is problematic because it uses when the case is brought, rather than when a court is seized of an action, as the point in time to determine which action should be given priority. Uncertainty will occur in this circumstance. Suppose that a party brings an action in court A but the court refuses to accept the case. Later the other party brings the same action in a sister-region court B and wins a favourable judgment. Then the judgment creditor applies to court A for JRE. The judgment debtor invokes this res judicata rule as a defence to JRE. JRE should be rejected according to the text of this rule. However, this result is unfair and unjust because it greatly encourages forum shopping: a party can simply bring a case in the region where her property is located in order to defend any future JRE. Thus, a better rule would be "JRE should be refused, if a court of the region where JRE is sought has jurisdiction over the same cause of action and had seized the action before the judgment-rendering court seized the action".
However, the fi rst res judicata rule is not without merits. The Mainland civil procedure is famous for its rapidity:
68 generally a fi rst-instance court will issue a judgment within six months after it accepts a case, 69 and an appellate court will render a judgment within three months after the appeal commences. 70 Under the fi rst res judicata rule, suppose that after a Macao court seizes a case, one of the parties conducts a forum shopping and brings a suit on the same cause of action in Mainland China. Under this res judicata rule, although the Mainland court makes a judgment earlier than the Macao court, the Mainland judgment is unrecognisable and unenforceable in Macao. However, the downside of this res judicata rule is that parties have to race to the court. Notably, the res judicata rule in the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is different, which provides that JRE should be refused if a court of the region where JRE is sought has made a judgment on the same cause of action.
71 Therefore, Mainland China compromises the rapidity of its civil procedure by implementing the MainlandMacao Arrangement. This is Mainland deference to Macao and symbolises mutual trust and understanding.
The fi rst res judicata rule raises a question: should a requested court deny JRE and entertain a negative declaratory action brought by the defendant when it had been seized of the declaratory action before the judgment-rendering court seized the case brought by the "natural" plaintiff on the same cause of action? This question involves both res judicata and lis pendens. Arguably, an action for a negative declaratory judgment should be entertained where the "natural" plain- 67 Ibid, Art 11.2. 68 Johnston supra n 33, 123 (stating that "Mainland legal system, which is well known for its rapidity compared to that of Hong Kong and other common law systems").
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Art 135 Mainland CPL. 70 Ibid, Art 159. tiff delays in fi ling suit to the detriment of the "natural" defendant. 72 However, a different scenario exists. The natural plaintiff does not delay in fi ling suit. On the contrary, the defendant conducts a malicious forum shopping and brings a negative declaratory action fi rst in the region where his assets are located in order to resist the recognition and enforcement of the sister-region judgment favourable to the plaintiff in the future. The requested court should apply the fi rst res judicata rule only when the natural plaintiff purposefully delays in fi ling suit.
The second res judicata rule is that JRE will be refused if the court of the region where JRE is sought has already recognised or enforced a judgment or an arbitral award on the same cause of action made by a court of a foreign country or by an arbitration tribunal.
73 This is the same as the res judicata rule adopted in the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.
The Mainland-Macao Arrangement provides two rules of due-process violation as grounds for refusing JRE: where the party that loses the case has not been lawfully summoned, or where the party with diminished capacity is not provided with any attorney or guardian according to the laws of the region where the judgment is rendered. 74 Nevertheless, neither of the two arrangements lists all possible due-process violations in the original trial. For example, supposing that a judge who should recuse according to the law of the region where the original trial was conducted did not recuse, or that the hearing judge accepted bribery, do such procedural defi ciencies fall into the ground of due-process violation under the two arrangements? The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement answers "no", because such cases fall into the category of fraud. 75 However, in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement the answer is unclear because fraud is not a ground for refusing JRE. Courts may interpret the aforementioned two rules of dueprocess violation broadly so as to include other procedural defi ciencies, or it may use the public policy exception to deny JRE. In order to avoid disputes in practice, it is advisable to design a generic due-process ground for refusing JRE and leave interpretation to the judges in F2.
The fi fth ground for refusing JRE is the public policy exception. The Arrangement provides that Mainland courts can deny JRE if it would be contrary to the basic principles of the laws or social public interests of the Mainland, and that Macao can deny JRE if it would violate the basic principles of the laws or public order of Macao. Advisably, both regions should exercise the public policy exception with strict restraint. Otherwise, this ground will become a catch-all escape clause and hinder interregional JRE. Of particular concern is whether the two regions will use the public policy exception to refuse JRE if they think the judgment-rendering court exercised exorbitant jurisdiction. Extending full faith and credit to the jurisdictional ground of the judgment-rendering court is a great achievement. It will become fruitless if the two regions are allowed to use the public policy exception to deny JRE because of jurisdictional disputes.
Moreover, Macao is famous for its casino industry but casinos are illegal in Mainland China. Suppose a party wins a judgment in Macao based on a gambling debt and seeks JRE in Mainland China, should JRE be denied according to the public policy exception clause under the Arrangement? The answer should be "yes", because the policy of "one country, two systems" allows each region to maintain its independent political, social, and economic systems; in Mainland China it is a deep-rooted tradition that casinos are against public policy 76 and recognising and enforcing judgments involving gambling debts would violate the fundamental principle of justice and prevalent conception of good morals. 
Problems of the Current JRE system
The two arrangements are laudable yet far from satisfactory, because a substantial number of differences exist between them and reconciling these differences will certainly take time and effort. No JRE arrangement exists between Hong Kong and Macao, so JRE between them is governed by regional laws. Thus, a judgment creditor in one region has to follow different laws to enforce his or her judgment in the other two regions, which is costly and time consuming. Moreover, the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is very narrow. Judgments excluded by this Arrangement are subject to regional laws in Mainland China and Hong Kong. Mainland courts are split regarding whether judgments excluded by the Arrangement are recognisable and enforceable.
78 Some courts may recognise and enforce judgments from Hong Kong by reference to the law of recognition and enforcement of Taiwanese judgments. 79 The majority of courts reject this approach on different grounds. Some courts apply the law of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments to judgments from Hong Kong. 80 This law requires either a JRE treaty or reciprocity existing between the country where the judgment is made and where JRE is requested. The fi rst requirement is not satisfi ed when a judgment from Hong Kong is beyond the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. Reciprocity in JRE has never been established between Mainland China and Hong Kong. Therefore, the second requirement is not met either. Consequently, Hong Kong judgments beyond the scope of the Arrangement cannot be recognised and enforced in Mainland China. The remainder of courts, however, hold that because Hong Kong has been reunited with China it is improper to consider its judgments as foreign judgments. These courts refuse JRE because they hold that [1996] 2 HKLR 395 (HC). This case concerns how a retrial, which may be brought by a procurator under the procedure for trial supervision, infl uences the fi nality of a Mainland judgment. In this case the plaintiff applied to a Hong Kong court to enforce a Mainland judgment. This judgment was fi nal under Mainland law because it was obtained in a fi rst-instance People's Court and then affi rmed by an appellate court. The defendant applied to stay the Hong Kong proceedings on the grounds that he had requested a Mainland procurator to issue a protest. The defendant argued that if a protest was lodged in due course, the judgment-rendering court would have to order a retrial and the court might revise the original judgment. The Hong Kong Supreme Court held that a Mainland judgment was not fi nal and conclusive for enforcement in Hong Kong in the light of the procedure for trial supervision. Available at http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/legal_ref/judgments. htm (accessed 7 January 2010). 84 As a sharp contrast to Hong Kong courts, US courts apply the law of the judgment-rendering court to decide whether a judgment is fi nal under the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFMJRA 87 In his view, Hong Kong courts should not deny JRE because of a theoretical possibility that a retrial may be brought in Mainland China. 88 He held that the Mainland reform of the procedure for trial supervision had made it practically impossible for the judgment debtor in this case to bring the retrial again. 89 However, the majority remanded the case partly on the procedural ground that the legal effects of the new Mainland internal regulations were unclear. 90 In 2007 the Mainland legislator -the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress -amended the CPL and largely reduced the circumstances in which a judgment-rendering court may reopen its own judgments.
91 It remains to be seen how Hong Kong courts will respond to the Mainland's efforts and whether they will apply Chiyu to refuse the recognition and enforcement of Mainland judgments beyond the scope of the Arrangement.
A way ultimately to solve all these JRE diffi culties is to develop the current two JRE arrangements into a multilateral arrangement between Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, as shown in Figure 2 .
Such a broad-scope multilateral JRE arrangement could help to promote certainty between parties and effi ciency for courts and society and boost commerce in the three regions. 92 arrangement is essential for interregional economic integration among the three regions.
C. CEPAS AND JRE
Interregional economic integration and JRE should develop together so that all participating regions can achieve the best comparative advantages. 93 For example, the development of the European common market requires the establishment of a JRE system between its members. 94 In return, the Brussels Convention and Regulation help to develop the common market, because once merchants know the judgments rendered in their favour at home can be recognised and enforced in the other region with certainty and at a low cost, they would be more willing to "buy and sell, work and hire, render and purchase services, and invest across [regions]". Brand, supra n 92, 620-26. 94 The signifi cance of JRE to trade is best described by an invitation note sent by the European Economic Community's Commission to the Community's six Member States on 22 October 1959 to invite them to negotiate the Brussels Convention. In this note, the Commission stated that "The economic lift of the Community may be subject to disturbances and diffi culties unless it is possible, where necessary by judicial means, to ensure the recognition and enforcement of the various rights arising from the existence of a multiplicity of legal relationships. As jurisdiction in both civil and commercial matters is derived from the sovereignty of Member States, and since the effect of judicial acts is confi ned to each territory, legal protection and, hence, legal certainty in the common market are essentially dependent on the adoption by the Member States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement of judgments." Von Mehren, supra n 72, 70. U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds) 100 The CEPAs are moving the three regions in the direction of a single market at an unprecedented pace.
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The two JRE arrangements aim to facilitate the increasingly free circulation of goods, services, capital and people among the three regions.
Taiwan has also established a very close trade relationship with the other three regions.
102 Since 2001, Mainland China and Taiwan have co-operated in improving cross-strait trade.
103 Their economic integration has been largely advanced by the conclusion of cross-strait agreements in air and sea trans- 2009 ). The Chen Li Hung court regarded Taiwanese courts as "non-recognised courts". In the words of Bokhary PJ, with whom the other members of the Court of Final Appeal agreed, "'non-recognised courts' . . . covers courts sitting in foreign states the government of which our sovereign does not recognise as well as courts sitting in territory under the de jure sovereignty of our sovereign but presently under the de facto albeit unlawful control of a usurper government. Our courts will give effect to the orders of non-recognised courts where: (i) the rights governed by these judgments are private rights; (ii) giving effect to such judgments accords with the interests of justice, the dictates of common sense and the needs of law and order; and (iii) giving them effect would not be inimical to the sovereign's interests or otherwise contrary to public policy. This is the principle; and none of it involves recognising any unrecognised entity. It goes purely and simply to protecting private rights." See Johnston, supra n 33, 599-600. As for JRE between Taiwan and Mainland China, in 1992 Taiwan published the Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This Act was revised in 2003 and Art 74 provides that: "To the extent that an irrevocable civil ruling or judgment, or arbitral award rendered in the Mainland Area is not contrary to the public order or good morals of the Taiwan Area, an application may be fi led with a court for a ruling to recognise it. Where any ruling or judgment, or award recognised by a court's ruling as referred to in the preceding paragraph requires performance, it may serve as a writ of execution. The preceding two paragraphs shall not apply until the time when for any irrevocable civil ruling or judgment, or arbitral award rendered in the Taiwan Area, an application may be fi led with a court of the Mainland Area for a ruling to recognise it, or it may serve as a writ of execution in the Mainland Area."
The two CEPAs and the proposed ECFA aim to bring the four regions into a single market. This process demands a multilateral JRE arrangement, just as the development of the EU single market requires free circulation of judgments. Figure 3 demonstrates the fundamental goal of the development of interregional JRE in China.
D. LESSONS FOR CHINA FROM US AND EU INTERREGIONAL JRE LAWS
The two bilateral arrangements in China establish a foundation whereby a multilateral JRE arrangement can be developed. This multilateral arrangement will ultimately realise free circulation of judgments among Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, and may be extended to Taiwan. Some academic works have looked to the interregional JRE mechanisms in the US and the EU for lessons to develop this arrangement. Although they have made outstanding achievements, most of the studies make general comparisons without digging into the details of the interregional laws in China, the US and the EU, and even less scholarship especially focuses on the JRE issues. For example, Professor Jin Huang acknowledges that drawing experience from other countries will help Chinese jurists to improve Chinese interregional confl ict of laws. 108 He rightly emphasises that any solution drawn by compara- tive studies needs to adapt to China's unique situation. 109 He also observes four distinctive features of the interregional confl icts in China. First, Chinese interregional confl icts are domestic confl icts but with an international scope because Hong Kong and Macao enjoy much broader autonomy than states in a federal system such as the US. 110 Second, the divergences of socioeconomic systems between Chinese regions signifi cantly increase the diffi culty of solving confl icts between them. 111 Third, certain international treaties may apply to one of the above Chinese regions and be inapplicable to the others, which brings the confl icts between international laws into Chinese interregional confl icts. 112 Last, no supreme court exists to co-ordinate and to develop interregional confl ict of laws between the four regions. 113 The four features are valuable, but Huang has not undertaken any comparative studies between China and other countries in detail. Similarly, Professor Tung-Pi Chen also points out that China may draw useful insights from foreign experiences to solve the interregional confl icts between Mainland China and Taiwan but he does not specify what these insights are.
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Mainland professors Guanghui Li and Han Wang propose that the ideal approach to solve interregional JRE in China is to refer to the US model and to make a uniform law applicable to the three regions. 115 However, Li and Wang do not explain what the "US model" is and how to make this uniform law. They also briefl y argue that China may draw useful lessons from the Brussels Convention. For example, they point out that the current arrangement between Mainland China and Hong Kong should be expanded to include the cases without choice-of-court agreements, and to include judgments involving consumers, the status and legal capacity of natural persons, and civil com- 109 Ibid. 110 The autonomy includes "legislative autonomy, judicial independence, and fi nal adjudicative power", ibid, 303-04. 111 Ibid, 304-05. 112 117 In this Act, the UK Parliament adopted a principle: directly effective EU law prevails over UK law. Putting this in the Chinese context, if a multilateral JRE arrangement comes into reality, it should prevail over any confl icting regional laws.
Obviously, more in-depth comparative studies need to be done between the JRE systems in China, the US and the EU, so as to improve the current two arrangements and ultimately design a multilateral JRE arrangement. Interregional JRE in China is confronted with four main challenges: the challenge relating to the socialist characteristics of Mainland law; confl icts between civil law and common law; weak mutual trust; and the lack of a court of fi nal review for cases from all the three regions. US and EU laws can shed light on how to solve these challenges.
The Socialist Characteristics of Mainland Law
Mainland China belongs to the family of socialist law, characterised by a powerful government, a dependent court system, the political leadership of the working class, and the public ownership of lands. These socialist characteristics make it problematic to recognise and enforce sister-region judgments against governments, workers and lands in Mainland China. Thus far, Mainland courts have never recognised and enforced such judgments. However, further interregional integration with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan will require Mainland courts to make a transition. Therefore, the recognition and enforcement of these judgments deserve special attention. Notably, recognition and enforcement of these judgments is also an issue in the interregional JRE in the US and the EU, although less acute than in the Chinese interregional JRE context. Insights from the US and EU will provide new perspectives for Mainland courts and help them to make this transition.
(a) Judgments Relating to Governments
When a party to a judgment is a Mainland government agency, two questions are especially critical: would Mainland courts categorise such judgments as not 116 Ibid. 117 being "civil and commercial matters"; 118 and would Mainland courts use the public policy exception to deny JRE? The problem is acute because many functions that would be performed by private actors in capitalist economies are assigned to government agencies in Mainland China.
In Mainland China, "civil and commercial matters" means matters between private parties such as between natural persons, 119 between legal persons, and between natural and legal persons. 120 In contrast, "administrative matters" refer to matters between a private party and a government agency exercising its public authoritative powers. 121 The key to their distinction is that the former is between parties of an equal status; but the latter is deemed to be between parties of an unequal status. For example, a judgment is administrative if it relates to a debt between two parties where one is required by the law to use the other's services or equipment at a price, a place or a procedure unilaterally decided by the latter, particularly when the latter is a government agency exercising its public power. 122 However, public institutions (Shiye Danwei), which are unqiue socialist organisations, may cause confusion in the JRE scenario. Public institutions are legal persons, owned by the Mainland government, to promote education, science and technology, culture, and hygiene. Schools, hospitals, publishing houses and television stations are typical public institutions. They are different from state-owned enterprises because of their non-profi t nature. However, there is no clear line between them and government agencies -for example the China Securities Regulatory Commission is a public institution, but it acts like a government agency. 123 Regarding JRE, a tricky case 118 The best way to interpret "civil and commercial matters" is to give it an autonomous meaning. See the discussion in the section of "confl icts between civil law and common law". 119 would be a medical malpractice judgment rendered by a sister-region court against a Mainland public hospital or a judgment against a Mainland public school because negligence by one of its teachers causes injury to a student. Under Mainland law, hospitals and schools are liable for doctors' and teachers' negligence when they act in the course of their duty. 124 Because public hospitals and schools are public institutions, the government will eventually pay for the judgments against them. Would Mainland courts hold such judgments in the category of "civil and commercial matters" in the JRE context?
The ECJ faced a similar question in Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann, which may serve as a valuable reference for Mainland courts. In this case, a German pupil was injured in Italy because of a teacher's negligence during a school trip. 125 The pupil's family applied to a German court for the enforcement of an Italian judgment against the teacher.
126 The German court made a preliminary reference to the ECJ, asking whether this case, " [w] here the holder of a public offi ce who has caused injury to another person by reason of an unlawful breach of his offi cial duties is personally sued by that person for damages", is a civil matter under the Brussels Convention. 127 The ECJ answered in the affi rmative because although a teacher working in a public school has the status of civil servant, he does not exercise public power because the teacher's "conduct does not entail the exercise of any powers going beyond those existing under the rules applicable to relations between private individuals" and a teacher in a public school or a private school assumes the same function to students.
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The ECJ also held that the fact that the teacher's liability was covered by a social insurance scheme governed by public law was irrelevant "since the basis of the civil claim, that is to say liability in tort or delict, is not affected by the existence of that public insurance".
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Although China's situation is different from the EU (eg teachers working in public schools are not civil servants), this case can provide two useful insights 124 Guo wu yuan ban gong ting guan yu yin fa zhong guo zheng quan jian du guan li wei yuan hui zhi neng pei zhi, nei she ji gou he ren yuan bian zhi gui ding de tong zhi for China. First, a judgment should not be categorised out of "civil and commercial matters" simply because it involves a Mainland public institution. Only when suffi cient evidence proves that the institution actually functions as a government agency may a requested court regard the case as an administrative case. Second, the question whether it is ultimately the government that pays for the judgment should be irrelevant to the JRE decision.
The second issue relating to judgments involving governments is whether Mainland courts would use a public policy exception to deny JRE simply because a sister-region judgment goes against one of its government agencies.
The doctrine of the public policy exception has played a role in Mainland legislation and judicial practice since the establishment of the PRC.
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But Mainland legislators have never used the term "public policy" in their legislation. Instead, they use terms such as "public interests", 131 "socio-economic order", 132 "the social and public interest of the country", 133 or "sovereignty, security or social and public interests". 134 Regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, Article 266 of the Mainland CPL provides that if a foreign judgment is against sovereignty, security or social and public interests, it should not be recognised and enforced. 135 Both Arrangements indicates that if 130 Ibid, paras 27 28. "In the case of an application or request for recognition and enforcement of a legally effective judgment or written order of a foreign court, the People's Court shall, after examining it in accordance with the international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China or with the principle of reciprocity and arriving at the conclusion that it does not contradict the basic principles of the law of the People's Republic of China nor violate State sovereignty, security and social and public interest of the country, recognise the validity of the judgment or written order, and, if required, issue a writ of execution to enforce a sister-region judgment is against Mainland social and public interests, JRE should be refused. 136 Notably, this wording departs from Article 266. 137 The reason is that since the three regions are within one country, they should not have any disputes over sovereignty and security. Therefore, "sovereignty and security" should be left out.
Thus far, it has never been reported that Mainland China has recognised and enforced any foreign judgments against its government agencies in civil and commercial cases. Will this practice continue in interregional JRE? In 2006, a reply made by the Supreme People's Court to a question posed by the High Court of An Hui Province (the "Reply") helps to answer this question. 138 This Reply addressed the issue whether the enforcement of an arbitral award against a government agency would violate Mainland social and public interests. 139 The dispute was between a Hong Kong company and a Mainland government agency. The latter invested 105 million RMB to buy equipment from the former but this equipment did not work as designed. The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Center ruled that the malfunction of the equipment was not due to the Hong Kong company so it made an award against the government agency. The High Court of An Hui Province refused to enforce this award on the grounds of social and public interests violation, because the government agency had invested millions in this equipment but gained no profi ts. A high court that would like to refuse the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award involving foreign and sister-region factors needs to seek the approval of the Supreme People's Court, 140 so the An Hui High Court asked the Supreme Court for its opinion. The Supreme Court ruled that it was improper to refuse the enforcement of this award on the grounds of a social and public interest violation, because social and public interests refer to the fundamental national legal order. In this case, the parties concluded and performed a contract, which did not violate social and public interests. In addition, the fact that the expensive equipment was left unused did not result from the enforcement of the arbitral award. Moreover, the Court it in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Law; if the application or request contradicts the basic principles of the law of the People's Republic of China or violates State sovereignty, security and social and public interest of the country, the People's Court shall not recognise and enforce it." 136 Ibid, Art 266. 137 Art 9 Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and Art 10 Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 138 But the wording of the Arrangement is consistent with Art 258 CPL, which provides that recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award should be refused if this award is against social and public interests. ruled that the failure of a governmental project has nothing to do with violations of social and public interests. Thus, this award should be enforced. This Reply does not presage that Mainland China will in the future be generally open to recognise judgments against its government agencies. But in this Reply the Supreme People's Court does not restrict its interpretation of social and public interests only to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Mainland courts should apply the Reply to interregional JRE, which will help soothe the concern that Mainland courts may abuse the public policy exception in order to protect government agencies in civil and commercial cases.
(b) Judgments Relating to Workers
The prologue of the Mainland Constitution indicates that the PRC is a country led by the working class.
141 Mainland laws and government policies always pay special attention to protecting the interests of workers. This section will fi rst answer the question of whether Mainland courts would recognise and enforce sister-region judgments against a state-owned enterprise, where doing so will bankrupt the company and cause it to lay off many workers. 142 This question was posed by a Mainland judge and caused much academic debate.
143 This section will then analyse the Mainland's special concerns in recognising and enforcing sister-region workers' compensation judgments. Finally, it will discuss how to expand the current Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement to labour contracts.
There are two reasons why Mainland courts should recognise and enforce sister-region judgments against a Mainland state-owned enterprise even if doing so will bankrupt it and cause it to lay off many workers. First, the Reply clearly indicates that the "social and public interests" refer to the fundamental national legal order. The Mainland Enterprise Bankruptcy Code provides that all enterprises, including state-owned enterprises, should be treated equally in a market economy, and state-owned enterprises are subject to the same bankruptcy proce- dure as other enterprises. 144 Therefore, bankruptcy of a state-owned enterprise will not harm the fundamental national legal order and consequently will not involve violation of social and public interests. Second, there are better ways to protect workers than denying JRE. In a domestic context in instances where a company may be bankrupted by the enforcement of a People's Court judgment, the enforcement proceedings will leave suffi cient funds to support the basic life of workers. 145 This law should apply to the interregional JRE context and the liquidated assets should be used to pay workers before being distributed to any other creditors.
Mainland China especially concerns what preclusive effects F2 should give to F1 workers' compensation judgments. If F1 renders a judgment to award a certain amount of money as workers' compensation to a party, and F2 in the other region also has jurisdiction over this case, can the party ask F2 to give an additional amount of compensation, or is F2 bound by the preclusive effect of the F1 judgment? Considering the vast exchange of workforces and business among the Chinese regions, 146 this scenario will possibly happen. The Mainland-Macao Arrangement requires F2 to recognise F1 judgment if none of the fi ve grounds for refusal exists. 147 The Arrangement further requires that if F2 has recognised and enforced F1 judgment, it should not accept a case based on the same cause of action.
148 Thus, the Arrangement precludes F2 from giving an additional amount of compensation to a worker. The Arrangement should make an exception for workers' compensation and successive workers' compensation awards should not be precluded. This can facilitate free movement of workers and in turn encourage interregional trade. Moreover, this advances Mainland special interests in protecting its workers without harming the interests of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
In the US, F2 determines whether the full faith and credit clause precludes it from making a successive workers' compensation award by defi ning what F1 had decided in its judgment. A good example is Thomas v Washington Gas Light Co. 149 In this case the worker resided, was hired and worked in Washington, DC.
150 His employer was from this region too. 151 The worker also worked for the same employer in Virginia where he was injured. 152 He received an award of disability benefi ts from the Virginia Industrial Commission under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act.
153 Several years later, he wanted to seek additional compensation in Washington, DC under its law. 154 The employer argued that the Virginia award must be given res judicata effect in Washington, DC to the extent that it was res judicata in Virginia. 155 The US Supreme Court held that Washington, DC could render a supplemental compensation award to the worker, even though he had received a compensation award in Virginia. 156 The Supreme Court noted that Virginia and Washington, DC had different interests: Virginia's interests included limiting the potential liability of companies that operated within its borders, protecting workers who worked there, having other states giving full faith and credit to its decisions; 157 Washington, DC also had an interest in protecting workers who worked within its borders. 158 The Court, however, ruled that these two regions did not have confl icts of interests in this case for three reasons.
159 First, because actions on workers' compensation could be brought in either region, employers always would have to use the more generous of the two workers' compensation schemes to measure their potential liability exposure. 160 Therefore, a region's interest in protecting the employers transacting business within its border was not of controlling importance. 161 Second, obviously, both regions had an interest in providing adequate compensation to the injured worker, which would not be harmed by allowing 149 a second region to award additional compensation. 162 Third, because the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of Virginia is limited to questions arising under Virginia law, it had not determined the worker's right under the law of Washington, DC, and therefore full faith and credit need not be given to what the Commission had no power to make.
163 As a conclusion, Washington, DC was free to decide the worker's right under its law, which would not confl ict with Virginia's interests. 164 Notably, however, the Court held that the factual determinations in the Virginia award should be entitled to collateral-estoppel effect in Washington, DC courts. 165 Valuable insights for China can be drawn from this leading US case. The interests of Mainland China and Macao in interregional workers' compensation cases are similar to those of Virginia and Washington, DC. They do not have a confl icting interest when F2 awards supplemental compensation, as long as an injured worker does not get double compensation. Accordingly, under the Mainland-Macao Arrangement the workers' compensation judgment rendered by F1 should not preclude an injured worker from seeking additional compensation from F2, if F2's law provides for a more generous award. Nevertheless, the factual determinations by F1 should have preclusive effect in F2 in a latter case based on the same cause of action. This can promote certainty between the parties and judicial effi ciency in Mainland and Macao courts.
The current Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement excludes cases involving labour contracts. 166 One way to develop this Arrangement is to include labour contracts into its scope. The current Arrangement does not distinguish choiceof-court agreements concluded before or after disputes have arisen. However, if the future Arrangement extends interregional JRE to cases involving labour contracts, the two regions may consider this proposed provision: in cases relating to individual contracts of employment, a choice-of-court agreement shall have legal force only if it is entered into after the dispute has arisen; otherwise it shall have legal force only if the employee invokes it. This is in accordance with Articles 13, 17 and 21 of the Brussels I Regulation. 167 This restriction of party autonomy is aimed at the protection of socially or economically weaker parties. 168 It will probably be welcomed by Mainland China and it also serves Hong Kong's interests by making it a more attractive place for Mainland skilled 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid, 282-83. 165 Ibid, 283 166 Ibid, 280-81. 167 Art 3 Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 168 Art 18 Brussels Convention provides that "In matters relating to individual contracts of employment an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall have legal force only if it entered into after the dispute has arisen or if the employee invokes it to seise courts other than those for the defendant's domicile or those specifi ed in Art 5(1)." Relevant provisions in the Brussels I Regulation are developed based on Art 18 Brussels Convention.
workers. Consumer contracts are excluded by the current Arrangement, so this proposal may also apply to consumer contracts, including insurance contracts where a nature person is the policyholder, the insured or a benefi ciary.
(c) Judgments Relating to Real Estate
Mainland law provides that a court where real estate 169 is located should have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes on the real estate. 170 In Mainland China, all land is under socialist public ownership, 171 and legal or natural persons, including those from sister regions, can own real estate including land use rights in the circumstances designated by law.
172 Both Mainland Arrangements with Hong Kong and Macao, respectively, provide that a region can deny JRE when its courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. Thus, Mainland China can deny JRE when a sister-region judgment involves any real estate located in its territory. However, many loan agreements concluded in sister regions may involve mortgages on real estate located in Mainland China.
173 This is because lending laws in Hong Kong and Macao are more liberal than those in Mainland China, so Mainland parties would go there to borrow money but may have to use their real estate located in Mainland China as collateral for the loan. If a Mainland debtor fails to pay the loan on time, a sister-region court may require the debtor to convey the title to the real estate to the creditor or to auction the real estate in order to pay off the loan. 174 There were many such JRE cases in Mainland courts before the conclusion of the two arrangements. 175 The courts generally denied JRE on account of the lack of a JRE 174 See Stein, supra n 172, 1329-30 (discussing the types of collaterals that borrowers offer to lenders). 175 If a piece of land is involved, the land use rights, instead of the title, will be conveyed or auctioned, because the title to land belongs to the state. arrangement or reciprocity. 176 Now, under the current two arrangements, could these judgments be enforced?
The US jurisprudence may shed light on this issue. In the US, the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over land also belongs to the court of the situs. 177 US courts recognise and enforce sister-state judgments involving land in other states by distinguishing the in rem effect and the in personam effect of a judgment. The opinion in Durfee v Duke is pertinent. In this case, after Durfee won a Nebraska case adjudicating the location of certain land to be in Nebraska and to be his, the losing party, Duke, re-litigated the case in Missouri. 178 The suit fi nally arrived at the US Supreme Court. The Court held that courts in Missouri should give full faith and credit to the Nebraska judgment. 179 But meanwhile the Court carefully pointed out that the in personam and in rem effects of the Nebraska judgment should be distinguished:
"It is to be emphasized that all that was ultimately determined in the Nebraska litigation was title to the land in question as between the parties to the litigation there. Nothing there decided, and nothing that could be decided in litigation between the same parties or their privies in Missouri, could bind either Missouri or Nebraska with respect to any controversy they might have, now or in the future, as to the location of the boundary between them, or as to their respective sovereignty over the land in question." 180 In other words, the F1 judgment directly affects and operates upon only the parties; it does not directly affect the relevant land. 181 Moreover, the lex situs should decide the effect of the F1 judgment against a third party, such as an innocent purchaser of the land. 182 Under the Brussels I Regulation, F2 can refuse to recognise an F1 judgment that confl icts with its exclusive jurisdiction. 183 Article 22(1) provides that the court of the situs has the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over real estate. Nevertheless, this provision only deals with claims founded in rights in rem and not rights in personam, which include contractual obligations on conveying rights in rem affecting real estate (eg ownership).
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The Brussels I Regulation requires Member States to observe the same exclusive jurisdictional rule, and the ECJ can ensure that these members consistently implement this rule. However, the situation in China is different. The two arrangements regulate only JRE and leave jurisdictional rules to the member regions. Furthermore, no court of fi nal review exists. Therefore, the American approach fi ts the Chinese situation better. Although distinguishing the in rem effect and the in personam effect of a judgment has been criticised by some commentators as arbitrary and confusing, 185 the result it brings is better than totally refusing JRE simply because a judgment involves real estate located outside of the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court. Therefore, the judgment in the hypothesis at the beginning of this section should be recognised and enforced under the two arrangements.
Conflicts between Civil Law and Common Law
Mainland China and Macao are infl uenced by the civil law tradition, whereas Hong Kong is governed by the common law tradition. 186 The differences between the two traditions complicate interregional JRE in China particularly in two aspects.
First, the same term may connote different meanings in different legal traditions. One example is fi nality. 187 In Mainland China, a fi nal judgment should not be subject to any appeal but can be subject to retrial. However, Hong Kong courts hold that a judgment is fi nal even if an appeal against it is pending but a judgment is not fi nal if it may be retried under the Mainland procedure for trial supervision. This sharp contrast has been well reconciled after the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement gave an autonomous meaning to the term "fi nality". 188 This Arrangement defi nes "an enforceable fi nal judgment" in the case of the Mainland as: 184 People's Court that has been authorized to exercise jurisdiction of the fi rst instance in civil or commercial cases involving foreign, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwanese parties, from which no appeal is allowed according to the law or in respect of which the time limit for appeal has expired and no appeal has been fi led; (3) any judgment of the second instance; and (4) any legally effective judgment made in accordance with the procedure for trial supervision by bringing up the case for a retrial by a People's Court at the next higher level." 190 This means that under the Arrangement, Mainland judgments subject to retrial and Hong Kong judgments subject to appeal can be recognised.
Second, certain terms may exist in one legal tradition but be absent from the other. For example, fraud is a ground for refusing JRE in Hong Kong law. It had never explicitly existed in Mainland law until the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement was concluded. Regretfully, Mainland 2008 implementing legislation of the Arrangement does not defi ne the meaning of "fraud". Mainland China is confronted with the issue of how to integrate the common law concept of fraud into its civil law system. One solution is to extend the defi nition of "fraudulent act" from the Civil Law Code 191 to the JRE context. However, this defi nition does not cover fraudulent acts by the court so it is much narrower than the defi nition of fraud in Hong Kong law. Consequently, the problem that the meaning of the same term varies in different legal traditions will occur.
The other solution for Mainland China is to adopt the Hong Kong defi nition of fraud in the JRE context. According to Hong Kong common law and statute, 192 fraud "must be [the action] of the party seeking enforcement, or of the court itself ". 193 For example, it could be that false evidence provided by a party is accepted by the judgment-rendering court, 194 that one party intimidated the other party by illegal acts such as violence in the proceedings that 189 Ibid, Art 2.1. 190 Ibid, Art 2.2. 191 Art 68 Opinions on Application of the General Principle of Civil Law of the PRC promulgated by the Supreme People's Court defi nes "fraudulent act" as "a party purposely conveys any false information to the other party, or purposely disguises any fact so as to induce the other party into making any false declaration of will". 192 Common law and statute provides the same grounds to impeach a foreign judgment obtained by fraud. § 6(1)(a)(iv) of the FJREO provides that: "On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the judgment . . . shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfi ed . . . that the judgment was obtained by fraud." 193 Johnston, supra n 33, 564. 194 See Birch v Birch [1902] P130 at 137-38. led to the judgment, 195 or that judges of the court take bribes even if the party relying on its judgment was not involved in the corruption. 196 Notably, Mainland China also recognises the acts under the heading of fraud in Hong Kong Law as grounds for refusing JRE, but it categorises these acts into the fi eld of undue process or public policy violation. 197 Therefore, it is not impossible for Mainland China to adopt the Hong Kong defi nition of fraud in the interregional JRE context. However, a barrier for the Mainland's adoption of the Hong Kong's defi nition of fraud is that it is rooted in numerous cases rather than a clear statute. 198 In the view of Mainland China, case-law is unsystematic and confusing. Furthermore, courts in Hong Kong defi ne "fraud" by reference to the English case-law. 199 It is hard for Mainland China to adopt a common law concept whose meaning may evolve according to the decisions made by courts in the UK. Therefore, the best solution is to provide an autonomous defi nition of fraud when the two regions decide to amend the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. The contents of this defi nition can be based on the Hong Kong law but its format should be clear and easy to implement, which suits the Mainland civil law preference. It is suggested that fraud should be defi ned by listing examples of fraud, such as providing knowingly false evidence, bribing judges or illegally intimidating the other party or witness.
The examples of "fi nality" and "fraud" demonstrate that adopting autonomous meanings is a good solution to reconcile the differences between the civil law and common law traditions. An autonomous meaning refers to a meaning disengaged from the special understandings that might be associated with it under a regional law or an international legal instrument that a region ratifi ed. 200 In other words, the interpretation of a certain word or phrase in an interregional legal instrument should not depend on the law of one or more of the regions concerned, but, fi rst and foremost, on the legal instrument itself. 201 Using autonomous meanings to defi ne terms or phrases in a legal instrument has valuable benefi ts. It can prevent the instrument from being subject to various regional laws, can increase certainty and predictability, can simplify the interpretation process, and also can ensure that the instrument will be applied in the way that it is intended to be applied. 202 The benefi ts of using autonomous meanings to ensure legal certainty and transparency in interregional JRE can be observed in the case-law of the ECJ, which has interpreted many terms and phrases in the Brussels Convention and Regulation in this way. 203 For example, the Convention and Regulation does not defi ne the phrase "civil or commercial matters". In a German JRE proceeding involving a Belgian monetary judgment, a German appeal court asked the ECJ whether, for purposes of interpreting the term "civil or commercial matters", reference should be made to the law of the state where the judgment was rendered or to the law of the state where enforcement is sought. The Court held that an autonomous defi nition should be given to this phrase:
Mainland China and Hong Kong and Macao, respectively. For example, a requested court should determine whether a sister-region judgment is achieved by undue process under the law of the judgment-rendering court. However, even though they were reunited ten years ago, mutual trust between the three regions remains fragile. For example, after the conclusion of the MainlandHong Kong Arrangement, the Hong Kong business community expressed deep worries about exposing Hong Kong businesspeople to judgments obtained through fraudulent means in Mainland courts. 206 These worries come from a stereotypical presumption that the Mainland court system is incompetent due to factors such as the lack of judicial independence, 207 local protectionism 208 and other issues. 209 However, a recent study proves that this presumption is not always correct. 210 Moreover, in Mainland China, not every court has jurisdiction over cases involving interregional elements. As for district courts, only those located in economic and technological development zones enjoy fi rst-instance jurisdiction over such cases, and they generally enjoy a better reputation for fair trial than courts in rural China. 211 This approach has been adopted by the JRE proceeding where the judgment debtor alleged that the creditor achieved this judgment by fraudulent acts in the judgment-rendering court in France. 218 The court carefully distinguished judgments made in an EU Member State from those outside of the EU. 219 It held that if a judgment debtor alleges that a judgment made in an EU Member State is tainted by fraud, the English court should fi rst consider whether a remedy lies in the judgment-rendering country, and if so, the court should leave the debtor to pursue his or her remedy in that country. 220 In any case, the court should not review the judgment in substance. 221 This case provides a valuable lesson for China: the requested courts should strictly observe the no-review-of-substance principle because this principle can foster the mutual trust. If the debtor has not litigated the allegation of fraud in the judgment-rendering court, the requested court should avoid reviewing the sister-region judgment in substance. It should suggest the debtor challenges the judgment under the appellate procedure or the retrial procedure in the judgment-rendering region.
Besides stereotypical presumptions about the Mainland court system, the weak interregional mutual trust also comes from the divergence between the legal systems in the three regions. 222 Put in simple terms, the three regions do not trust each other partly because they are unfamiliar with each other's legal systems. So, enhancing interregional communication is extremely important. The Mainland-Macao Arrangement has made a valuable effort. It authorises a requested court to directly contact a judgment-rendering court in the other region to verify the genuineness of the judgment. 223 Moreover, it also requires the Supreme People's Court and the Court of Final Appeal of Macao to provide each other with legal materials related to the implementation of the Arrangement and to inform each other of the results in implementation every year. 224 Such communication channels will tremendously enhance interregional understandings. However, they are, regretfully, absent from the MainlandHong Kong Arrangement. EU law also provides good examples of enhancing communication on interregional legal affairs. For example, Council Regulation 290/2001 establishes a legislative basis to continue the "Grotius" programme of incentives and exchanges for legal practitioners in civil law, "entailing training, exchange, work-experience programmes, meetings, studies, research and information". 225 More importantly, Council Decision 2001/470 established a European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters. 226 This Network aims to facilitate judicial co-operation, information exchange and periodic direct meetings between the national courts in EU Member States. 227 All these EU instruments are valuable references for China. For instance, a current urgent issue is that someone wanting to research JRE laws in China is overwhelmed by the divergences of legal systems involved. Therefore, Chinese regions may refer to the European Judicial Network website 228 and jointly establish a Chinese website that outlines interregional laws and regional laws (eg civil and commercial laws, civil procedural laws, JRE laws, legal aids, court systems and case-law). Each region may also establish an interregional JRE offi ce or designate judges or civil servants in the Supreme Court or the judicial department as contact points responsible for interregional co-operation. All these efforts aim to make the laws in one region more understandable and usable for the public, judges and lawyers in the other region. So persons in transregional litigation will have better access to justice.
The Absence of a Court of Final Review
The Supreme People's Court in Mainland China, and the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong and Macao, respectively, are the highest court in each region and are equal in authority. No court of fi nal review exists to hear cases from all three regions. Establishing such a court is impossible in the near future, because doing so would probably be deemed to intrude upon the policy of "one country, two systems." The absence of a court of fi nal review may leave interregional JRE arrangements subject to inconsistent interpretations in the courts of each region. This can be partly remedied by giving autonomous meanings to terms and phrases in the arrangement-making process. The second solution is for the highest court in each region to regularly exchange information and participate in meetings to discuss how to uniformly interpret and apply the arrangements. Notably, interregional JRE in the US involves fi fty states and the EU twenty-seven Member States. 229 It is diffi cult for so many members to co-operate and maintain consistent interregional JRE without the supervision of the US Supreme Court or the ECJ. However, Chinese interregional JRE involves four regions at most. The small number of regions makes the co-operation between them considerably easier. If the four Supreme Courts or the four judicial departments co-operate well, consistent application of arrangements is theoretically possible even if a court of fi nal review is absent. However, this solution cannot assure litigants that regional courts will uniformly interpret and apply the arrangements. 230 Another solution is to establish an organisation for interregional judicial cooperation that is responsible for the uniform interpretation of the arrangements. A preliminary question is whether it should be a governmental or non-governmental organisation.
Both methods deserve to be tried. For example, the Supreme Court or the judicial department in every region could jointly establish a commission for co-operation in interregional JRE issues. Alternatively, the Chinese Society of Private International Law in Mainland China 231 could co-operate with academic organisations in the other three regions to promote interregional legal exchange. Because currently no association contains members from all Chinese regions, another channel of co-operation is to establish a comparative Chinese law association. It should be a non-governmental and non-profi t organisation comprising the élites of academia, the judiciary and the private bar from the four regions. Its mission would be to promote the clarifi cation and simplifi cation of the interregional laws, including interregional JRE. It may draw useful insights from the development and function of the American Law Institute (ALI). 232 The ALI is also a private, non-profi t corporation, 233 and has played a very important role in the harmonisation of American state laws since its establishment in 1923. 234 It is dedicated to addressing controversial issues involving diffi cult intersections of policy and social interests and its projects include restatements 235 and model laws. 236 It will certainly take years for the proposed comparative Chinese law association to become a major force, like the ALI, in shaping interregional laws in a plural legal system. The success of the proposed association will come from its contribution to the advancement and unifi cation of laws in China's interregional confl icts.
E. CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of interregional JRE studies in China is to develop a multilateral JRE arrangement on the basis of the two current bilateral arrangements. It is hoped that the new arrangement can be extended to Taiwan. Interregional JRE laws in the US and the EU provide a rich reference resource for this endeavour. This paper aims to help solve the four most crucial challenges that the interregional JRE in China faces. As a summary, fi rstly, Mainland courts should prepare to make a transition and to recognise and enforce sister-region judgments involving Mainland governments, workers and lands. Mainland Courts should defi ne "civil and commercial matters" broadly and should restrict the use of the public policy exception. Courts should be allowed to leave suffi cient funds to support the basic life of workers before distributing the liquidated assets of a company to other creditors. In terms of workers' compensation, F2 should be allowed to give additional compensation to an injured worker under its law as long as this worker does not get double compensation. F2 should distinguish the in rem effect and the in personam effect of an F1 judgment that involves real estate in F2. Secondly, giving autonomous meanings to terms and phrases in the arrangements is an excellent way to solve confl icts between civil law and common law. Thirdly, the weak mutual trust between regions can be improved when F2 strictly refrains from reviewing F1 judgments in substance and when one region is better informed of the laws and legal system of the other region. Fourthly, the most severe challenge is that no court of fi nal review exists to guarantee the consistent application of arrangements in Chinese regions. The four Supreme Courts and/or the four judicial departments should co-operate to achieve consistent application of the arrangements.
For the diffi culties that the ALI faces when its project intends to change the status quo, particularly in terms of upsetting important economic relationships, see generally C Silver, "The Lost World: Of Politics and Getting the Law Right" 236 Hazard, supra n 233, 662.
As a Chinese proverb says, "A journey of ten thousand miles must begin with a single step." This paper is only a single step. There is still a substantial amount of work to develop Chinese interregional JRE rules, in order to deal with the new challenges brought by the more and more frequent interactions among the distinctive regions within one China.
